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This  article  contributes  to  the  understanding  of  embodied  practices  and  experiences 
within adapted physical activity. It presents a study of a 4-day winter sports camp for 
young people with cerebral palsy. The experiences of the participants were investigated 
through qualitative interviews. The findings are analyzed through a phenomenological 
framework of embodiment and the notions of body schema and body image. By paying 
special attention to the bodily experience of “I can,” this study shows that participants 
learned  new  ways  of  approaching  challenges,  gained  bodily  control  in  challenging 
situations, expanded their fields of possible actions through practicing, as well as learned 
to  understand  and  accept  themselves.  These  findings  reveal  central  values  of  bodily 
interventions for people with cerebral palsy and have the potential to inform pedagogical 
work within the area of adapted physical activity. 
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To understand the value of a winter sports camp, it is important to consider the experiences of 
the participants. Phenomenoalogy provides a solid theoretical and methodological framework 
for investigating experience. It can contribute with an approach to studies and interventions 
within adapted physical activity (APA) that is different from other dominating approaches. 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the aim and purpose of APA have been interpreted 
and  defined  in  many—  sometimes  conflicting—ways  (Hutzler  &  Sherrill,  2007).  It  is 
generally seen as a cross-disciplinary field of study and practice, where interventions have 
historically been governed by what in disability research is referred to as the medical model, 
and to a lesser extent a social model, of disability (Reid, 2003; Silva & Howe, 2012). In a 
rough generalization, the medical model implies a focus on the physical and anatomical body. 
It is rooted in the natural sciences, and disability is in this perspective related to a person’s 
impairment.  The social  model  in  contrast  focuses  on structures  that  stand in  the  way of 
participating in social communities. Disability is a form of social oppression and is related to 
participation  restriction  (see  Kristiansen,  Vehmas,  &  Shakespeare,  2009;  Oliver,  1996; 
2Ralston & Ho, 2010). Although a number of scholars agree that APA should move away from 
the medical model of disability, the medical approach is still reflected in much of the APA 
literature (Jespersen & McNamee, 2008; Silva & Howe, 2012). 
As  an  alternative  to  the  medical  and  social  models,  authors  have  argued  for  the 
relevance of taking a phenomenological approach to disability (Carel, 2013; Peckitt, Inhara, 
&  Cole,  2013;  Svenaeus,  2009),  and  Martiny  (2015)  has  on  this  basis  proposed  a 
phenomenological  model  of  disability.  This  model  focuses  on first-person experiences  of 
living with disabilities and asks what the experience of it is like. There has been a growing 
interest in phenomenological approaches to APA, with several qualitative studies informed by 
the participant experiences (Bredahl,  2013; Duesund, 2008; Duesund & Skårderud, 2003; 
Goodwin,  Lieberman, Johnston,  & Leo,  2011; Standal,  2011,  2014; Standal  & Jespersen, 
2008). Standal (2014) provides a comprehensive review of phenomenological studies in APA 
and argues for the relevance of phenomenology as philosophy and pedagogy in the field. He 
outlines  three  central  concepts  from  phenomenological  philosophy:  (a)  first-person 
perspective; (b) embodiment; and (c) life world, suggesting that these concepts can fruitfully 
contribute to the development of phenomenological pedagogy in APA. 
The present study seeks to contribute to these recent developments in the field. We 
present a study of a winter sports camp for young people with cerebral palsy (CP). CP is 
defined as a group of disorders affecting the development of postural and motor control and 
occurring as a result of a nonprogressive lesion in the developing central nervous system, 
causing activity limitation and muscular hyperactivity (Bax et al., 2005; Rosenbaum et al., 
2007). A current trend in research and clinical practices for CP relates to the development and 
optimization of antispasticity treatment protocols (Pandyan et  al.,  2005),  accompanied by 
interventions that focus on the neurological, physiological, or biomechanical aspects of motor 
control and function, which can be said to be governed by the medical model of disability. In 
this article, we present an alternative to this, as we analyze and discuss the experience of the 
participants through phenomenological insights regarding bodily experience. 
Conceptual Framework 
Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy concerned with attaining an understanding and 
description of experience. Part of this is related to the experiential structure of our embodied 
life or embodiment. A central figure in the development of phenomenological accounts of 
embodiment is the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In his work The Structure of 
Behavior,  he  argued  that  behavior  (comportement  in  French)  cannot  be  sufficiently 
understood  in  physically  reductive  or  intellectualist  terms:  “behavior  is  not  a  thing,  but 
neither is it an idea” (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 127). As an alternative, Merleau-Ponty (1963, 
p. 182) described movement as a “significative whole” that rests on the experienced meaning 
of it. In his subsequent work Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (1962) qualified 
this understanding of bodily subjectivity and movement. Following the works of Edmund 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty adopted the term “I can” to describe our bodily being-in-the-world 
that is prior to “I think.” Between rational thinking and the physical body, he paid special 
attention to bodily habits, which he clarified to be “a knowledge in our hands, which is only 
given through a bodily effort and cannot be translated by an objective designation” (Merleau-
3Ponty,  1962,  p.  166).  This  implies  that  bodily  understanding and learning are  not  solely 
physical or cognitive abilities. They belong to the realm of “I can” and involve experiencing 
“the  accord  between  what  we  aim at  and  what  is  given,  between  the  intention  and  the 
realization—and the body is our anchorage in a world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 167). 
On the  basis  of  these  phenomenological  insights,  Gallagher  (2005)  has  pursued an 
understanding of the experiential aspect of embodiment by clarifying a classic and central 
distinction between two terms of  embodiment:  body image and body schema.  The body 
image consists of “a complex set of intentional states and dispositions—perceptions, beliefs, 
and attitudes—in which the intentional object is one’s own body. This involves a form of 
reflexive or self-referential intentionality” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 25). The body schema, on the 
other hand, is  “a system of sensory-motor functions that operate below the level of self-
referential intentionality. It involves a set of tacit performances—preconscious, subpersonal 
processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 
26). This distinction thus describes the difference between reflective self-awareness (body 
image)  and  prereflective  self-awareness  (body  schema).  In  practice,  these  experiential 
dimensions of embodiment are two closely related systems that function intertwined, but the 
analytical  distinction between them can help us better  describe and understand embodied 
experiences. 
Embodiment and CP 
Importantly,  body  image  and  body  schema  describe  two  central  aspects  of  human 
embodiment that we all have in common. Even if bodily experiences can be different for 
people with CP, the difference is a matter of degree rather than a disruption of the experience 
of being abled (see Martiny, 2015 for further elaboration). In fact, we will argue that working 
with people with different kinds of embodiment can shed light on general aspects of bodily 
subjectivity.  Putting  this  in  relation  to  the  terms  of  embodiment,  two  aspects  can  be 
highlighted. 
First, Gallagher (2005, p. 27) describes how: “In much of our everyday experience . . . 
our attention is directed away from the body; toward the environment or toward some project 
we are undertaking.” Relying on the body schema is not always possible for people with CP. 
For example, spasms can force individuals with CP to pay attention to their body to control 
their movements. In such situations, ordinary movements such as walking involve a different 
degree of body image because the body is not just tacitly “there.” 
Second,  Gallagher (2005,  p.  29) suggests  that  “In some pathological  cases .  .  .  the 
subject’s relationship to his/her body is mediated by an observational judgment, and in some 
cases it is precisely a negative judgment about ownership.” CP can be such a case where the 
body, due to muscle contractions, seems to do things on its own. This phenomenon can be 
experienced as “involuntary movements.” A study looking at the body image of adolescents 
with  CP suggests  that  they  are  more  apt  to  regard  their  bodies  as  unreliable  (Hammar, 
Ozolins, Idvall, & Rudebeck, 2009). As Peckitt et al. (2013, p. 139) have put it, for a person 
with CP, the experience of the world can be one of “constant and yet unpredictable disruption 
between intention and action.” 
4These  aspects  can  illustrate  how  the  general  structures  of  embodiment  can  be 
experienced in different ways in the case of CP. The purpose of our study was to explore 
these experiences in practice. By doing this, we aim to qualify our understanding of the ways 
in which APA interventions can be of value for people with CP. 
Methods
1
Context 
The context for our study was a winter sports camp arranged by the Elsass Institute (EI) 
located  near  Copenhagen.  The  camp took  place  on  March  5–9,  2014,  and  involved  the 
participants traveling to Beitostølen Health Sport Center in Norway. The camp was arranged 
and carried out by a professional team of two ski instructors and four staff members from EI, 
one of whom has CP. We will refer to these individuals as pedagogues. 
The participants (four girls and seven boys) aged 14–18 were all Danish citizens. They 
were recruited through the EI mailing list, and all had previously been part of other projects 
taking place at EI. Together with their parents, they were informed about the study at an 
introduction day at EI. At this point, participants and parents were able to raise any concerns 
that they had about the project. Participants and parents were assured that the information and 
descriptions gathered within the project would be used for research purposes only. They were 
also  informed  that  there  was  no  required  level  of  development  or  success  criteria  for 
participation. At the end of the introduction day, they each signed a consent form.2 
The participants were all diagnosed with a mild degree spastic CP which, in relation to 
the gross motor function classification system developed for children with CP, correlates to 
Level I–II (Palisano et al., 1997). This means that the participants have the functional abilities 
to perform gross motor skills, such as walking, running, and jumping, in most settings, but 
that the coordination, speed, and balance of their performance may be limited. They may also 
experience difficulties when tasks become too challenging, such as in walking long distances 
or in balancing on rough terrain, or crowded, confined spaces. 
The main activity at the camp was alpine skiing. In addition, participants took part in 
other  activities  such  as  snow  rafting,  dog  sledding,  and  indoor  social  activities.  These 
activities were structured as group activities. A central pedagogical aim of the camp was to 
create a safe environment where the participants could experience physical, cognitive, and 
social challenges. Another pedagogical aim was to provide participants with experiences of 
success and mastery to expand their horizon regarding their capabilities. To achieve these 
aims, the pedagogues discussed coping strategies with the participants at larger meetings with 
1. Some of the descriptions in this section also appear in Martiny and Aggerholm (2016), which has a more 
elaborated description of the intervention.
2. This kind of study does not require approval from an ethics board in Denmark. According to the Danish 
Research Ethics Committee, only medical and health care research that involves human biological material, 
such as tissue, cells, and embryos, needs to be approved by a research committee. Questionnaires, interviews, 
and registration research only need to be approved if human biological material is part of the project. 
Nonetheless, the utmost care was taken to ensure that all participants remained safe physically, emotionally, and 
socially.
5everyone present,3 and during the camp, the pedagogues continuously structured and adapted 
the challenges together with the participants and according to their individual preconditions, 
expectations, goals, and level of function. 
Data Collection 
To  investigate  the  experiential  value  of  the  winter  camp,  we  conducted  qualitative 
semistructured group interviews.  The interview guidelines were inspired by “explicitation 
interviews”  in  an  attempt  to  integrate  a  qualitative  interviewing  approach  with 
phenomenological philosophy (Bitbol & Petitmengin, 2013; Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 
2003;  Petitmengin,  2006;  Petitmengin  &  Bitbol,  2009;  Vermersch,  2009).  This  form  of 
phenomenological  interview  aims  to  take  serious  the  ontological  and  epistemological 
commitments that follow from such philosophy. According to Høffding and Martiny (2015), 
this means following four general commitments: 
 (a) To the thing itself: Using the interview to acquire detailed first-person descriptions 
of an experience in question. 
 (b)   Invariant  structures:  Using  the  interview  to  grasp  the  invariant  structures  of 
experience. 
 (c) Subjectivity cannot be reduced to objectivity:  In the interview, the first-person 
perspective needs to be understood on its own terms. 
 (d) Enaction, embodiment, and embeddedness: Phenomenology construes subjectivity 
as embodied, enactive, and embedded. The interview directly confronts us with these 
aspects of experience (pp. 22–23). 
 Adopting an explicitation approach requires a focus on the invariant phenomenological 
structures of experiences in a way that retains the subjectivity of the experience, including its 
embodied, enactive, and embedded nature. In addition to these commitments, more specific 
strategies  were  used  in  the  interviews,  such  as  seeking  detailed  descriptions,  helping 
interviewees to  focus attention on their  experiences,  and supporting interviewees as  they 
rendered  their  experiences  into  words.  Petitmengin  (2006)  has  done  excellent  work  in 
systematically presenting these strategies. In this article, we cannot do justice to all the details 
of the phenomenological interview, but one defining feature is that instead of only asking 
“what” or “why” questions, which tend to draw interviewees toward explanations of their 
experiences, this interview method uses primarily open “how” questions. In our case, the 
focus was on how the participants experienced themselves and their bodies before, during, 
and after the challenging activities on the winter camp. We asked, for example, “How did you 
cope with that situation?” “How was it to get the skis on?” or we simply responded with a 
“how?” to their descriptions, to draw the interviewees toward more detailed and descriptive 
aspects  of  their  experience,  enabling them to  give first-person descriptions  of  their  lived 
3. For example, the pedagogues introduced a color narrative, which the participants could use to describe their 
experiences of being challenged. Being in the “green zone” indicated that they were not challenged. Being in the 
“yellow zone” indicated that they were challenged but felt that it was possible to overcome it. Being in the “red 
zone” indicated that the challenge was experienced as too extreme or overwhelming (see Martiny & Aggerholm, 
2016, for more on the pedagogical work related to the camp). 
6experiences.4 
Between February 16, 2014, and May 11, 2014, we conducted nine interviews in total. 
The 11 participants were divided into three groups (one group with three and two groups with 
four participants), and we performed three interviews with each group: (a) a week before the 
winter camp, (b) a week after the winter camp, and (c) 2 months after the winter camp. Each 
interview lasted approximately 1–11⁄2 hr and was recorded with an audio recorder. Prior to 
the last interviews, we showed the participants a video of themselves skiing as a form of 
stimulated recall.  The choice  of  group interviews was an intentional  attempt  to  combine 
structured questioning with more informal conversations (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2005, 
pp. 287–288). This strategy allowed for more rich descriptions and the possibility for the 
participants to add to each other’s descriptions. The names of all the participants have been 
anonymized in this article. 
Descriptive Analysis 
The  nine  interviews  were  transcribed,  structured,  and  analyzed  in  accordance  with 
phenomenological methods of descriptive analysis (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, pp. 19–28). 
We relied on traditional analytical work in phenomenology and used descriptions from the 
interviews as a point of departure for our phenomenological analysis. In particular, we used 
the strategy of “phenomenological consistency” to validate the descriptions (see Høffding & 
Martiny, 2015). 
First, we operated with an “internal phenomenological consistency,” which refers to the 
ability  to  make  comprehensible  the  descriptions  found  in  the  interviews.  The  more  the 
descriptions can be made comprehensible under a certain phenomenological interpretation, 
the  stronger  the  internal  phenomenological  consistency.  Second,  we  operated  with  an 
“external phenomenological consistency,” which refers to the ability of the overall account 
produced  to  work  with  and/or  against  already  established  theories  of  the  phenomena  in 
question.  In  our  case,  this  meant  theories  coming  from research  in  CP,  phenomenology, 
cognitive  science,  sport  science,  and  APA.  External  phenomenological  consistency 
encompasses what Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009, p. 391) call “performative consistency,” 
which they describe as agreement among: (a) the theories, (b) the construction of devices and 
the understanding of their functioning, (c) the theoretical guidance of measurements, and (d) 
the results. This understanding of consistency is also seen in the tradition of phenomenology, 
where  validation  is  understood  as  socially  performative  and  pragmatic,  highlighting  the 
importance of “intersubjective validation” (Varela & Shear, 1999, p. 10) or “intersubjective 
corroboration”  (Gallagher  &  Zahavi,  2008,  pp.  29–31).  The  process  of  producing  and 
validating  knowledge  thus  requires  a  collective  process  to  strengthen  phenomenological 
consistency.  In  our  case,  the  collective  process  of  validation consisted  of  presenting and 
discussing  descriptions  from the  interviews  with  the  participants  and  their  parents;  with 
physio- and occupational therapists, psychologists, and neurologists from the EI; and with 
scholars coming from research in CP, phenomenology, cognitive science, sport science, and 
APA at conferences and workshops. 
4. For a more elaborated account of this interview method and how it relates to the research area of embodied 
cognition, see Høffding and Martiny (2015). 
7Findings and Discussion 
In the following, we will present and discuss the findings of our analysis. In keeping 
with the work of Merleau-Ponty and to investigate the value of focusing on embodiment in 
APA, we focus on three central dimensions of the participants’ experiences of “I can”: (a) yes 
I can, (b) yes I can if I practice, and (c) yes we can. 
(a) Yes I Can 
Findings: Gaining Bodily Control  in Challenging Situations.  Many of the participants 
described how they were used to avoiding rather than taking up challenges in their everyday 
life. For some, the very activity of going away on a camp with people who they did not know 
in advance was a challenge . Also, because there is rarely snow in Denmark, skiing was an 
extraordinary activity for the participants. The camp therefore marked a contrast to everyday 
life,  and in the interview prior to the camp, many of the participants expressed not only 
excitement but also uncertainty and anxiety related to skiing.  This apprehension was,  for 
example, expressed by Signe, who said: 
My balance, it is maybe not really good, right, and then I think, that when you stand on a 
pair of skis, where it is slippery, it may become worse than it is already, right . . . or it 
will be more difficult to keep balance, right . . . . But apart from that I look forward to it.5
This  kind  of  “mixed  emotions”  that  included  worries,  insecurity,  excitement,  and 
expectations was characteristic  both for  participants  who had been skiing previously and 
those  who  had  not.  A common denominator  was  uncertainty  as  they  faced  the  possible 
experience of “I cannot,” which naturally raised the question: “can I do it?” 
A significant part of the experience of uncertainty was related to a sense of control. 
Participants  in  our  study  suggested  that  they  often  experience  stress  and  try  to  control 
situations by reflecting on, thinking about, and planning their actions. This way of gaining 
control was also part of their experience at the winter camp. As they arrived at Beitostølen 
and began their endeavors on ski, two of the participants described how they tried to control 
their movements by talking to their legs as they were skiing to make them do what they 
wanted them to do. Signe described: 
Many times I also spoke to my legs, because my legs don’t really want to do what I want. 
So, there were times where I told them “now you will stop, now it’s me who decides” 
and then we went down the slope again . . . . My legs said that they couldn’t anymore, 
they did not want to be there anymore, but my head said something else. I think it’s a 
way to gain control. Often I said “right, right, right, right” or “plough, plough, plough, 
plough, plough.” Many times, I said that to myself, and I think that when you say it out 
loud, it helps your body to obey . . . . It wasn’t always that they [her legs] would obey. 
Signe’s  description  here  is  characteristic  of  several  participants.  They  wanted  to  do  a 
particular movement but were not always able to do it. In relation to this, Signe mentioned a 
technique called ploughing, which is a strategy for slowing down on the slope by placing the 
skis in a V-shape with the ski tips closer together. This makes it easier to keep balance and 
control  speed.  Learning  to  plough  gave  Søren  an  experience  of  control  of  the  current 
5. We have translated this and the following quotes from participants.
8situation, so he could take on new challenges: 
It was great to learn to plough, since then you could accelerate, but before that, you could 
only take the small hills where you didn’t get much speed. When you could plough, then 
you could take the big ones . . . . It was liberating. [I: Were you sometimes uncertain?] 
Sometimes I was, but not very often. Then I just sat down and gained control. It was 
great when you got down to the bottom of the hill and then looked up: “I’ve just run 
down of that.” 
Søren’s description is one example of how the participants acquired control in the uncertain 
situation  on  the  slope.  From  our  study,  however,  it  appears  that  the  participants  also 
experienced another kind of control on the ski slope during the camp. One participant, Ditte, 
described it in the following way: 
It’s nice to be able to do something, but it’s also nice to feel that you can really do it 
and that it’s not just skiing down the hill and then sitting down in order to stop. But it’s skiing 
down the hill, trying something new, looking around . . . the feeling that I can easily ski and 
then at the same time, without being worried, keep an eye on Jeppe [another participant], that 
too was nice. The freedom that I can look at him and that I don’t always have to focus on my 
ski, focus on not falling or on loose snow, or something like that. 
As she describes it, her slowly acquired sense of bodily control, which is related to her 
(growing)  ability  to  ski,  gives  Ditte  a  novel  freedom to look at  surroundings and others 
instead of focusing on her own body or her skis. In a similar way, many of the participants 
described  how  they  gradually  experienced  improving  their  bodily  control  in  difficult 
situations on the ski  slope.  Jimmy described how he,  slowly and with assistance from a 
pedagogue, could make more relaxed turns on the slope, a point that highlights a different 
experience of control. For Jimmy and others, improved ability to maneuver on the skis was 
accompanied by a sense of being relaxed, calm, and able to “let go” and enjoy a freedom 
related to the ability to focus on various aspects of their situation other than their own body. 
In the last interview, some of the participants described how they experienced being 
more  relaxed  and  calm  in  their  everyday  actions  after  the  camp,  for  example,  when 
unexpected things occurred. In the last interview, Signe and Rasmus also described how they, 
during written exams after the camp, had a sense of being calmer and relaxed about the 
situation. When Signe felt stressed during the exam, she took a break to get herself together, 
and then she tried again—just like she did on the ski slope. 
Discussion: The Value of Faith in the Body Schema. These findings can shed light on the 
general  understanding of  obstacles  and challenges in  APA. The two kinds of  control  the 
participants experienced on the ski slope can be analyzed as an attentive exercise of control 
and a bodily sense of being in control (Paherie, 2007). The participants’ descriptions reveal a 
dialectical relation between explicit awareness and not being aware of the body, which is 
interesting to  analyze through the  distinction between body image and body schema.  As 
Gallagher (2005, p. 34) describes: 
9If for some reason the body-schematic performance fails, the body takes center stage in 
the perceptual field. A loss of balance, disequilibrium between body and environment, 
may motivate a spontaneous appearance of the body in attentive consciousness. 
This is what is often experienced by people with CP. It was most explicitly expressed by the 
participants through the rather explicit bodily awareness as they “talked to” or “yelled at” 
their legs on the slope. With more experience, however, the participants were able to focus on 
other things in their environment instead of their own body. Their bodies and the position of 
their skis were no longer the object of their attention all the time, and this bodily sense of 
ability on the ski slope can be interpreted as a matter of gaining faith in the body. Through the 
experience of skiing, they learned to rely on the prereflective functioning of the body schema 
rather than paying explicit attention to their bodies. This is in accordance with Gallagher’s 
(2005, p. 34) analysis as, from the quote above, he goes on to describe: 
Improved performance of the body schema, however, pushes the body into the recesses 
of awareness. The successful maintenance of posture, an equilibrium attained between 
body and environment, allows us to be more attentive to the world and our surroundings 
than to our body. 
This appears to describe very well the participants’ experiences on the ski slope. Their actions 
and  abilities  were  incorporated  and  became  part  of  their  bodies,  allowing  them  to  pay 
attention to others and their surroundings in general; a phenomenon that was in particular 
evident in Ditte’s descriptions of her experience at the ski slope. 
This interpretation mirrors phenomenological insights from other studies within APA. 
Jordbru, Jespersen, and Martinsen (2008) described the paradoxical case of people who from 
1 day to the next lose their ability to walk (conversion gait disorder). Such persons fit into 
neither somatic nor psychiatric hospitals because the disorder can be located neither as an 
organic nor a psychic illness. Instead, the authors highlighted how behavior therapy as part of 
APA can provide a fruitful bodily approach, where the interventions consisted in the apparent 
paradox that the persons regained control of their bodies by actively becoming unaware of it. 
From this, the authors argued that using the body can help the persons to forget the body and, 
further, that forgetting the body improves their movement. A similar conclusion was reached 
by Duesund and Skårderud (2003), who described that horse riding interventions for people 
with anorexia nervosa helped them forget their bodies. More specifically, it reduced negative 
attention  toward  their  own  bodies.  In  the  context  of  rehabilitation,  Standal  (2011)  has 
described how the embodied learning of wheelchair skills can be understood as a kind of 
“reembodiment,” which he interprets as a gestalt switch from body image to body schema. 
To  further  refine  this,  Merleau-Ponty’s  (1962)  phenomenological  account  of 
embodiment, and in particular his description of the embodied process of learning, can be of 
value: 
Consciousness  is  being  toward  the  thing  through  the  intermediary  of  the  body.  A 
movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it 
into its “world,” and to move one’s body is to aim at the things through it, or to allow 
one’s body to respond to their solicitation, which is exerted upon the body without any 
representation. (pp. 159–161) 
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As the experiences of the participants have shown, this process of learning can involve a 
reflective awareness of one’s body when actions do not conform with one’s intentions. But 
their process of learning exemplified a movement toward incorporating their new abilities in 
order for them to grasp the motor significance of skiing on the slope. Hence, it was not a 
cognitive process in the sense that a refined mental representation made them capable of 
controlling their movements of the body. Rather, they experienced “being toward the thing,” 
for example, toward the challenges on the ski slope, where the object of their attention was 
not their own bodies and where they, for the same reason, could rely on their body schema, 
could enjoy other aspects of their situation, and let their surroundings reveal new possibilities 
for action. 
Merleau-Ponty  argued  that  “objective  science”  cannot  grasp  how  difficulties  and 
ambiguity related to movement and/or perception can sometimes be resolved by having faith 
in  the  immediate  and  bodily  relation  to  the  world.  He  describes  this  phenomenon  as  a 
primary, originary, primordial, and perceptual faith (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 280, 305, 344, 
375, and 475), which in relation to Gallagher’s clarifications can be described as faith in the 
body schema. The descriptions from the participants in our study indicate that this kind of 
faith was part of what they learned on the camp. 
Ditte’s experience of “I can” due to her improved control of her body was accompanied 
by a sense of being able to let go, relax, and not attempt to have cognitive control over her 
body.6 This sense of being in control of course takes a level of ability, in this case skiing 
techniques to keep balance, but it also takes a bodily trust and faith in these abilities. It shows 
that control does not always mean explicitly or consciously controlling your body and the 
situation. In fact, sometimes the body works better when you are not reflectively aware of it. 
The  experiences  of  skiing  showed that  the  reflective  experience  of  having  or  exercising 
control  is  intimately  related  to  the  prereflective  experience  of  being  in  control.  The 
phenomenological understanding of body schema can thus inform a refined understanding of 
bodily sense of control. 
This reveals how embodied interventions such as skiing can allow participants to work 
with sense of control in an embodied, situated, and experience-based way. Skiing appears to 
have given some participants an experience of new aspects of their bodies.7 The study has 
shown that winter sports camps and in particular the ski slope can be a highly suitable venue 
for creating and providing meaningful challenges that are adapted to the level of functioning 
for each participant; a quality that can at the same time be highlighted as a special quality of 
APA in general. 
6. This points to an understanding of bodily self-confidence that is at odds with existing cognitive theories of 
self-confidence (e.g., self-regulation and self-efficacy), where control and ability are related to an explicit belief 
in oneself. For a discussion of this, see Martiny and Aggerholm (2016). 
7. The fact that some of the participants described being more relaxed when experiencing challenges, for 
example, exams, after the camp can tentatively be interpreted as a positive result of having learned to rely more 
on their prereflective being-in-the-world.
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(b) Yes I Can If I Practice 
Findings: Expanding the Field of Possible Actions. For many of the participants, being in 
control was, however, not the ultimate aim. Most of the participants actively sought new 
challenges once they were able to control the situations without experiencing uncertainty. 
They continuously tried to push their limits at their own individual level, and in several of 
their descriptions, the ski slope provided a very suitable venue for this kind of experience. 
Here, they could not simply take off their skis and walk down; or, that would at least not 
make the situation easier for them. Instead, they had to get up and try again when they fell. 
The slope thus invited experiences where they were on the limit of “I can” and “I cannot,” 
and where they could repeat particular ways of moving on the skis until they were able to do 
it. 
The border between “I can” and “I cannot” was of course highly individual and each 
participant had his or her own aspects of skiing to practice. Ditte described how she liked to 
practice “my own kind of slalom,” while others worked on being calm on the slope. Some 
found the limit to their abilities as soon as they put the skis on and started moving, while 
others  found  it  by  going  down  steeper  hills  or  going  off-piste.  Jeppe,  who  was  more 
experienced,  described how he had fun actively trying to  transcend his  comfort  zone by 
speeding up, running over bumps on the slope, or attempting to jump in different ways. 
Attempting challenging activities is of course not without danger, and Jeppe actually 
broke  his  arm  as  he  attempted  a  new  jump.  In  a  less  dramatic  way,  other  participants 
described not only how skiing was related to toil and trouble, but also how it was related to 
meaning and how they, despite pains and exhaustion, engaged in more difficult challenges on 
the second day of the camp. 
Rikke  described  a  similar  experience:  “You  tried  something  new  and  got  more 
confidence. [I: How?] By saying that you did it, when you finally did it, and when you didn’t 
do it, you say: ‘I must try until I do.’” Rikke further described how she gained a belief in 
herself  during  the  winter  camp,  and  that  in  daily  situations  afterward  when  she  doubts 
whether she can perform a certain action, she has become more inclined to continuously try 
until she succeeds. This kind of bodily experience at the camp also appeared to have changed 
some participants’ approach to challenging activities after the camp. Signe described how she 
experienced that “I can (do), more than I thought I could” and how she has, after the camp, 
decided  to  pursue  an  ordinary  3-year  high  school  program instead  of  an  adapted  4-year 
program. Ditte applied for an exchange student program and Tobias started playing football 
with others of his age who do not have CP instead of the special CP team he played with prior 
to the camp. These changes are noticeable in their descriptions, and it is interesting to see 
how many of them stated that they experience and approach challenging situations in their 
everyday life differently after the camp, that is, as something that does not necessarily stop 
them from doing what they want to do. 
A good example of this was described by Frederik, who loved to ride his three-wheeled 
bike around the small city where he lives. He had never tried to ski before and was not sure if 
he was able to do it. In the interview after the camp, he described how he had been nervous in 
the beginning and did not think he would be able to ski. With help from the pedagogues, 
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however, he slowly managed to stay on the skis and go faster. This experience of being able 
to do something, which he did not think he could do, appeared to be of importance to him. 
Two  weeks  after  the  camp,  EI  received  a  video  of  Frederik  from  his  parents  with  the 
following introduction: 
If you can dream it, you can do it. Frederik’s biggest dream since his first bike has always 
been to ride a 2-wheeled bike just once in his life. We often tried, but never succeeded. 
Until he tried skiing with the Elsass Center. And when he succeeded the next goal was 
now to ride a 2-wheeled bike. And so he did, from 3 to 2 wheels in 4 days. 14 years on 3 
wheels and 5 days skiing = riding a 2-wheeled bike. Thanks to the personnel at the Elsass 
Institute. (anonymized and translated text from the video) 
This is, however, not the end of the story. A week before the last interview, he had learned to 
ride a moped, and in the interview, he expressed that he now wanted to learn to drive a car. 
Again,  we are  not  claiming that  this  is  solely  an effect  of  the  camp,  but  in  light  of  his 
descriptions and remarkable changes, it is interesting to question why he is now suddenly 
capable of doing these things that he could not do before. In the last interview round, we 
asked Frederik about riding the two-wheeled bike: 
I: Why haven’t you done it before? F: I didn’t think about it before. I didn’t believe in it. 
I: Why? F: I have been able to a little the last years, I tried a little, but then I didn’t feel 
like it anymore. I have to succeed the first time, otherwise I don’t feel like doing it. I: Is 
that different now? F: Yes. I: You didn’t succeed in riding the bike the first time. F: No I: 
What has changed? F: Now I gave . . . . If I don’t succeed the first time, then I just have 
to try again. I: Did you learn that on the ski trip? F: Yes. I: What was it about the ski trip? 
F: If I want to do it, then I just have to get up again and go [skiing]. 
Frederik is a person of few words with a relatively severe speech impediment. This meant 
that we had to guide him and ask more specific “why” and “what” questions in addition to 
open “how” questions. Still, from his descriptions, it appears that the bodily experiences on 
the camp have played a constructive role in expanding the field of possible movements for 
him. 
Discussion: The Value of Practicing. These findings show that an important part of the bodily 
experiences at the camp was related to the experience of practicing.8 The bodily experience of 
skiing at the camp was an arena where the participants, in a concrete and meaningful way, 
experienced practicing. Their description of practicing can shed light on a valuable aspect of 
APA, as it can reveal an important qualitative and processual dimension of their experience. 
In our discussion of this, we focus on Frederik’s experiences. 
Even if Frederik learned new strategies for keeping his balance, riding a two-wheeled 
bike was not something (i.e., a specific skill) he learned at the ski slope. This suggests that the 
specific nature of the learned skills might not be the most important aspects of their learning. 
Rather, the participants’ descriptions reveal that the process of practicing and overcoming 
challenges had a value in itself. Also, learning new things did not mean that they stopped 
8. For a more thorough analysis of this movement phenomenon, see Aggerholm (2015, 2016).
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challenging themselves. They, and in particular Jeppe, went on to find new obstacles and 
challenges on the slope. This indicates that it was actually the journey rather than just the 
destination that made sense for them; they found it meaningful, not just to reach their relative 
goals, but to make an effort in the process toward them. 
The value of practicing in an APA context also appears to transcend an outcome that 
can be reduced to physiological effects or expanded or improved motor functions. The fact 
that Frederik was able to ride a two-wheeled bike after the camp can hardly be reduced to an 
effect of neurological or other kind of physiological change (e.g., muscle strength or level of 
fitness). On the other hand, it would also be difficult to argue that Frederik’s new ability was 
solely due to a cognitive or psychological change, because he expressed a strong will to ride 
the bike also before the camp; it was, as his parents described it, his biggest dream. This is 
not to say that the cognitive aspect played no role in his development, but we will argue that a 
phenomenological  account  of  embodiment  can  provide  a  deeper  and  more  adequate 
understanding of this kind of learning process. 
Like the experience of control, it can be of value to regard the process of practicing in 
relation to Frederik’s bodily experiences. Gallagher (2005) describes how an awareness of 
bodily movements and abilities (body image) can affect and play a constructive role in the 
process  of  practicing  body-schematic  performances.  From  this,  it  could  be  argued  that 
Frederik’s  bodily  experience  of  being able  to  do  more  than he  thought  he  could  do,  by 
“getting up and trying again” as he put it, gave him a new awareness of his bodily capabilities 
and  made  him  see  his  body  schema  as  something  he  could  revise  and  refine  through 
practicing. 
This  can help understand how the participants  took something more profound with 
them from the camp, namely the bodily experience of being able to modify what they can and 
cannot  do  by  practicing.  This  is  interesting  in  relation  to  CP,  where  the  experience  of 
intention  and  action  can  be  disrupted  because  movements  are  sometimes  experienced  as 
“involuntary,” which can be experienced as limiting the field of possibilities for actions. This 
study has shown, however, that the relation between intention and action does not have to be 
constant; the limits to one’s actions are not determined by the degree of functional ability (or 
disability). By practicing on the ski slope, the participants expanded their fields of actions 
both in relation to the concrete activity of skiing, but apparently also in general. Some of 
them described a sense of being able to do more than they thought they could, which appears 
to have altered their attitude toward subsequent situations in their everyday life. 
Another interpretation would be to consider the change as related to the body schema. 
This involves looking toward other aspects of consciousness than the processes that involve 
belief, awareness, and judgment. Gallagher (2005, p. 146) describes how the prereflective and 
bodily aspects of experience tacitly structure our experience and action before we know it, as 
they “operate as constraining and enabling factors that limit and define the possibilities of 
intentional consciousness.” On this basis, he argues against neurophysiological and cognitive 
understandings  of  perceptual  experience  and  action.  Body  schemas  are  not  reducible  to 
neurological functioning and the body’s perceptual attunement transcends conscious control 
because it in fact shapes cognition and experience (Gallagher, 2005, pp. 139–146). 
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From  this  understanding,  it  can  be  argued  that  Frederik’s  bodily  experiences  of 
practicing on the ski slope revised his body schema, which, in turn, altered the intentional 
consciousness  that  constrains  and  enables  the  range  of  possible  ways  of  perceiving  and 
approaching  situations  (e.g.,  riding  a  two-wheeled  bike).  This  way  of  interpreting  his 
development  would,  in  Merleau-Ponty’s  words,  involve  the  embodied establishment  of  a 
novel relation of meaning to the challenging situations Frederik meets. Merleau-Ponty (1963, 
p. 130) describes this as a “general power of responding to situations of a certain type by 
means of varied reactions which have nothing in common but the meaning.” 
Applying these insights to the case of Frederik, it would not suffice to say that Frederik 
has recorded and fixated the accomplished movements on skis at a neurological or physical 
level or that Frederik has learned to set explicit goals and apply the means to reach these 
goals. Rather, it would be more in line with a phenomenological interpretation to argue that 
his experience of being able to do more than he thought he could if he “gets up and tries 
again” has built up a novel and general bodily way of relating to challenging situations. 
This points to a generality of the body schema that is interesting in relation to the more 
general value of APA. The bodily experiences on the camp appear to have “colored” the 
perception and action of the participants in other areas of their everyday life, and this can 
inspire approaches in rehabilitation to focus on more bodily interventions where participants 
get to practice by meeting adapted challenges. 
(c) Yes We Can 
Findings: Being in the Same Boat and Learning From the Others. Another aspect that the 
participants focused on in the interviews was the experience of social relations on the camp. 
Typically, the participants experienced themselves as not being as “normal” as other peers in 
their daily life. They all had mild degree spastic CP and felt like they are in a “gray zone” 
because they do not feel as “disabled” or “abnormal” as the ones who are not able to walk 
and, for example, have to use wheelchairs. But on the camp, they were among other peers 
with similar degrees of CP, and they expressed a sense of belonging. 
One participant, Joachim, runs differently to others at school, but in the first interview, 
he stated that it  does not matter to him what they think. However, as he saw a video of 
himself  prior  to the second interview, he said,  “Oy,  I  didn’t  look that  stupid.” This  may 
suggest that the look from outside does matter, an indication that was sustained as he later on 
stressed how he enjoyed the social relations at the camp. It gave him a security, a comfort 
zone, where he could focus on skiing. He described how the social “gets into the body” and 
how it allowed him to focus on skiing and enjoy the moment, instead of “thinking thoughts.” 
The feeling of being in the same boat as the others, being equal, was thus experienced as a 
relief. 
Ditte described that the social aspect of the camp was like being in a bubble. She forgot 
about the looks from others and what people were thinking of her appearance: “You forgot 
what  people  saw  when  they  saw  us  in  a  group  here,  who  do  not  walk  properly,  who 
don’t . . . . But you forgot about it, because you were just in this little bubble.” She described 
that she often feels fragile and different from the norm. At the camp, as part of the group of 
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peers, she was the norm. For a while, she was not different and experienced a “break” from 
the eyes and attention of everyone else. 
Other  participants  also  suggested  that  they  enjoyed  and  learned  from sharing  their 
experiences  with  peers  that  were  “in  the  same  boat”  and  had  similar  experiences  as 
themselves in their daily life. All the participants described how knowing that others feel the 
same as  you  and  have  the  same struggles  helped  them accept  many  of  their  own daily 
challenges after the camp. They described how it changed their approach to problems and 
ultimately helped them accept their own disability in another way. As Ditte described it, after 
the camp, she has the courage to state her needs, for example, that she has to rest more than 
others at her boarding school; after the camp, she said, “I feel more like myself.” 
One of the pedagogues on the camp had CP himself and became a role model for many 
of  the  participants  by  sharing  his  experiences  of  living  a  life  with  CP.  Many  of  the 
participants also became role models for each other. Ditte described how she had often made 
excuses as she took part in physical education at school: 
One thing is not to be able to do it, but something else is then, that you feel that the 
others maybe see you as disabled, because you may not be able to do what they do. That 
is not nice, because you want to feel that you are part of the place you are in. (. . .) If you 
have to make excuses all the time, so you don’t really become part of what the others do, 
then it is maybe just not as fun. 
After  the  camp,  her  attitude to  this  kind of  situation has  changed.  She described this  in 
relation to her experience of watching the video of Frederik riding the two-wheeled bike: 
It was so fun to watch and so lovely to see, because . . . . I don’t know if he learned to 
believe in himself, but there was just something that had changed and it was so great . . . . 
This was something that really sunk in and showed me that our disability shouldn’t stop 
us from pursuing the things we want . . . . One can easily say “I think, I’ll just pass,” 
because we have, after all, this excuse, we have our disability. We can always, especially 
with strangers, use it as an excuse if there is something we don’t dare to do . . . and that’s 
probably because people don’t fully understand what it entails. Then almost always, if 
there’s something you really feel uncertain about, you can use it as an excuse and say “I 
have this disability that makes it difficult, so I probably can’t do what you are asking me 
to do” and I just think that it may well be, that you can’t do it quite like the others from 
perhaps school, but . . . it could well be that you could in fact do it. To learn how to do it 
is the way I think about it now. 
In this way, Frederik became a role model for Ditte as he inspired her to see her disability, not 
as  something  to  use  as  an  excuse  for  not  being  able  to  partake  in  an  activity,  but  as  a 
legitimate  part  of  her  comportment  that  she  accepts  and  that  should  not  stop  her  from 
engaging in uncertain and challenging situations. 
Jeppe, the youngest participant,  was even more explicit  about his experience of the 
others at the camp as role models. Three of the other participants attended a boarding school, 
which has made him aware that this could be an opportunity for him as well. Tobias, who 
shortly after the camp started playing football with young people without CP, gave Jeppe a 
sense of “if he can do it, I can do it too.” Jeppe was used to “mirroring himself” in others 
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without CP, for example, other skateboarders in his neighborhood, but at the camp, he felt a 
special  relation  to  the  group,  and  he  described  his  experience  of  these  relations  in  the 
following way: 
When I look at my disability, then I don’t see it as . . . . I can do that sometimes . . . but 
not like toil and trouble . . . then I think more about it as a gift, kind of. You get a certain 
unity with one another. I don’t know about the others, if they, like me, have this fighter-
will, but I don’t think I would have this without them. It’s about mirroring oneself in 
others. (. . .) I think that . . . . It might be that it gives me a lot of disadvantages, but it 
also gives me a lot of advantages, about understanding life, kind of. Yes, in that way . . . . 
You shouldn’t see it as a disadvantage, you should see it as a gift, otherwise you don’t get 
anything out of it. 
In this way, the special experience he had on the camp has contributed to seeing his own 
disability as a kind of advantage, and even a gift, rather than a disadvantage. 
Discussion:  The Value of  Social  Relations.  These findings indicate  that  the social  aspect 
played a central role in the embodied experiences of the participants both during and after the 
camp. In general, people with CP often experience a reflective awareness of their own body 
and their appearance, as they sense the gaze of others (Hammar et al., 2009). This kind of 
experience was, in the descriptions of the participants, related to a sense of being different 
than others,  for  example,  the others  at  their  school.  In Joachim’s descriptions,  it  became 
apparent that reflection is not just an individual matter. It is also about the social relations, 
that is, how they are reflected in the social surroundings. 
Researchers have argued for the special relevance of sports camps as a “therapeutic 
landscape” for experiencing a sense of community that can help young people connect and 
thereby move beyond their previously understood limits (Goodwin et al., 2011; Goodwin & 
Staples,  2005).  This  was  also  the  case  in  our  study.  In  phenomenological  terms,  the 
experience of being among others with the same degree of CP contributed to an experience of 
bodily coexistence. At the winter camp, the participants were not the ones that do not fit in, 
not  “the others,”  anymore.  They appeared to  be less  reflective about  their  relations  with 
others, which can be interpreted as a relation of intercorporeality where there is a direct, 
affective, and bodily resonance between persons (Gallagher, 2008). Being in a bubble, or 
being in the same boat, allowed them to pay less attention to their own body and more to their 
surroundings. It “goes into the body,” as Joachim put it, and allows them to be more relaxed 
and calm, and forget how they appear in the eyes of others. Thus, it allowed the participants 
to be less self-conscious. 
The participants also expressed the importance of sharing experiences with each other, 
looking toward the others, and learning from each other. Standal and Jespersen (2008) have 
argued for the crucial role of social relations and situations as part of learning in and through 
APA. A social and situated view on learning transcends a focus on acquiring techniques and 
skills,  and allows individuals  to pay attention to other  dimensions regarding identity and 
negotiation of meaning in communities of practice. Peers can function as role models and 
exemplars  in  APA  interventions,  as  they  embody  the  goals  of  learning  and  present 
17
participants with standards of excellence to which they can compare themselves in order for 
them to guide their development. This was central to many participants in our study, most 
explicitly in Ditte’s experience of seeing the development of Frederik. In general, our study 
shows  that  the  social  relations  on  the  camp  played  a  constructive  role  in  shaping  the 
participants’  understanding  of  themselves.  This  can  be  interpreted  with  help  from  the 
phenomenological account of a socially embedded narrative self (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, 
pp.  194–195).  This  describes  how  we  develop  in  social  contexts  and  how  we  come  to 
understand both ourselves and others through sharing narratives. The relation to others thus 
plays a crucial role in the development of a self-narrative, which in our study was illustrated 
by the way that the sense of being accepted by others appeared to play a valuable role in the 
participants’ self-understanding and self-acceptance. 
In this way, the relations to others at the camp played a crucial role for the participants, 
and in relation to this, it is interesting that many of them stated that their parents were very 
surprised about their expanded abilities during and after the camp. This social element of 
embodiment points to how the camp appears to have been a valuable “free space,” where the 
participants have been able to bracket expectations regarding their abilities that they meet in 
their ordinary everyday life and take up new challenges in a new social setting. This points to 
how bodily experiences can contribute to challenging existing discourses and norms. Many of 
the parents indicated that the events during and after the camp had opened their eyes to how 
the functional limitations of their children are changeable rather than fixed. This can help 
refine their own, as well as others’, understanding of what the young people are able to do. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have presented a study of a winter sports camp for young people with CP. 
Through a phenomenological  analysis of the findings of this study, we have paid special 
attention to the embodied experience of the participants in this intervention. This focus on 
experience was presented as an alternative to medical and sociocultural approaches in APA, 
and  through  our  focus  on  embodiment,  it  also  presents  a  contrast  to  more  cognitive 
interventions.  By focusing  on  the  phenomenological  notion  of  “I  can”  and by  using  the 
conceptual tools of body image and body schema to analyze the bodily experiences of the 
participants, our analysis highlighted three central ways in which the camp contributed to 
their development: first, by giving them an experience of higher degree of being in control as 
they  learned  to  have  more  faith  in  their  body  schema;  second,  by  providing  bodily 
experiences  of  how  both  their  body  schema  and  body  image  can  be  altered  through 
practicing; and third, through social relations that allowed them to be less self-conscious and 
understand themselves in new ways. 
Because this was a small-scale qualitative study that did not operate with a control 
group, the generalizability of the findings and long-term effects are not evident. Also, the 
findings cannot be used to directly prescribe how future camps should be organized. But our 
findings can contribute to underpinning the value and importance of bodily experiences with 
challenges in APA for young people with CP. These young people took home something from 
the camp that is much more profound than motor function or cognitive skills, as it involved 
their bodily being-in-the-world. By highlighting the experiential and bodily dimensions, the 
18
study can thus inspire and inform more qualitative- and experience-based approaches in APA, 
which can provide the basis for future pedagogical work in this field. 
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